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 Abstract:  
 
 
 
Alongside a sustained debate about the role of the EU in the international system and 
the nature of its power as an external actor, foreign and security policy making 
continues to reflect an awkward mixture of civilian, military and normative 
instruments, and ambiguous goals. The European Security Strategy of 2003 and the 
drive, via ESDP, to make the EU respond more effectively to crises, are the most 
systematic attempts yet to resolve this incoherence and to project the EU as a different 
kind of international actor by deploying an integrated range of civilian and military 
capabilities and resources. This paper examines whether the EU also needs a new 
conceptual framework for its international presence which can organise and improve 
the integration of its civilian and military characteristics , and at the same time 
express to both its own citizens and the outside world, the values and goals which 
underpin its external action. 
 
The paper takes the concept of Human Security and explores whether a Human 
Security doctrine could provide a shared strategic narrative for the EU which would 
serve to clarify and consolidate the nature of EU actorness. The paper takes the 
example of the EU mission to DR Congo in 2006 to show how a Human Security 
doctrine could provide conceptual coherence to the exercise of EU external power.  
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‘We know that it is possible to transform relations between states and alter the lives of 
millions of citizens. That should continue to be a source of inspiration for all of us’
1 
 
Introduction: 
Half a century old and still unclear about what it wants to be: the European Union has 
reached a certain age with an uncertain sense of self- assurance, at least in the field of 
foreign policy. Labels characterising this hesitant and debutante international actor are 
suggestive of the contradictions behind its personality: in 1999 it was ‘normative  
power’,
2 in 2003, the European Security Strategy phrase was a ‘(formidable) force for 
good’, with the Union urged to adopt an ‘active’ foreign policy.
3 Being nice at the 
same time as being noticed is a chronic dilemma for the Union which has made 
significant strides in developing the external side of the integration project without  
resolving underlying questions about the precise nature of its international actorness. 
There is the further paradox at the heart of  EU external relations that the Union’s 
self-proclaimed purpose is  to assert its identity and presence on the world stage 
through an ‘active’ foreign policy, yet this is a policy area where the requirement for 
agreement between member states means the Union has often been gripped by 
paralysis and stalemate.  
 
In the five years since Manners coined the normative power characterisation, tension 
between the conception of power as on the one hand, able to shape international 
opinion, and on the other, to impose its views through various coercive means, has 
become more significant. 
4 The search for a foreign policy rationale to substitute for 
the absence of the nation state’s classic defence of territory, or the pursuit of a more 
or less well defined ‘national interest’ has been made more pressing by a desire on the 
EU’s part to be both distinctive, and still part of a recognisable pattern of behaviour in 
                                                 
1 Javier Solana ‘Europe in the world in 2057’, European Union the Next Fifty Years, FT Business 
March 2007 
2 I.Manners (2002) ‘Normative Power Europe:a Contradiction in Terms?’,Journal of Common Market 
Studies 40(2),235-58. 
3 ‘A Secure Europe in a better world’, The European Security Strategy, 12 December 2003 
4 H.Sjursen,(2006) ‘The EU as a “normative power”: how can this be?, Journal of European Public 
Policy 13:2 ,235-251, March 2006.    4 
the international system; to be sui generis, and non-state like, but at the same time to 
play in the premier league of global politics.  
 
Thus in 2007, there are more shades of grey, even inconsistency and uncertainty about 
the EU’s international personality, than the normative power thesis suggested in 2002.  
Drawing on Manners’ insight that the symbolic components of the EU’s international 
identity deserve attention, this paper examines the possibilities for the EU to develop 
a strategic narrative, which can express the normative basis of its foreign policies, but 
which seeks a better accommodation with the EU’s willingness to enforce these 
norms with different types of coercive and non-coercive power.  The aim of this 
narrative is precisely to address the latent inconsistencies or tensions in its foreign 
policy discourse
5, about what kind of international actor it is, and what a Union 
foreign policy is for, and to articulate this in a form which engenders both internal and 
external support for its actions.  
 
The first section considers the role of a narrative in terms of internalist and externalist 
demands on European foreign policy. The second section deals with the question of 
what kind of narrative is appropriate for the EU, and suggests that a human security 
narrative could offer a more balanced view of the mixed nature of the Union’s foreign 
policy personality; and in the last section, the paper looks at the example of the EU’s 
current engagement in the Democratic Republic of Congo to see whether a human 
security narrative is relevant in the light of empirical experience.  
 
1. Driving forces and discordant discourses 
 
According to Manners’ original conceptualisation , normative power is a way of 
understanding European foreign policy (EFP) through its basis in norms, and its 
ideational capacity to diffuse these norms in the international system. Normative 
power is an addition to, rather than a contradiction of previous characterisations such 
as civilian or military power, and it also seeks to add a cognitive dimension to 
considerations about what kind of actor the EU is, and away from a purely empirical 
                                                 
5 I take discourse as a way of signifying a domain of social practice, manifested in and through 
language. See N. Fairclough (1995) Language and Power, London, Longman.    5 
analysis. Its ability to: ‘shape conceptions of “normal” in international relations needs 
to be given much greater attention’.  
6 
 
The sharp edges of discrete characterisations of the EU’s foreign policy personality 
have been rubbed away in recent years as the EU has sought to develop both civilian 
and military instruments, and while it continues to advance a normative discourse in 
which a putative EU ‘interest’ in foreign affairs is defined by a set of shared values, 
and crises and challenges to Europeans are seen in terms of threats to those values, 
irrespective of their source or location. 
7 
 
 The central topos of a normative discourse is the EU’s tendency to use norms and 
values in order to cultivate a distinctive position in international relations. Power per 
se is subordinate to and only achieved through the choice of particular tools, such as 
an emphasis on ideals of democracy promotion and the observance and respect of 
human rights. Indeed overt power of the classical –ie military – kind, is assumed to 
constitute a negation of the precise nature of the EU as an international actor. Instead 
it eschews ‘high politics’ or ‘hard security’ in favour of a more nuanced use of its 
armoury.  
 
This notion of an inverted power paradox has been taken further by scholars who have 
focussed on the EU’s denial of traditional power as something which was not desired, 
but forced upon it in the absence of an ability to deploy classical might or statecraft in 
international relations. Caught naked in the brutal state of nature of interstate politics, 
the EU has fallen back on a Hob(be)son’s choice of having its way by other means. 
Metaphors such as ‘America cooks and Europe does the dishes’ part of  Kagan’s 
Venus and Mars analogy have given an edge to the normative discourse, and chipped 
away at the pure symbolism of its ideal foreign policy
8, although as Hyde-Price 
points, out the correlation between relative power capabilities and a ‘civilian’ strategic 
culture is either poor or negative. 
9 
 
                                                 
6 Manners 2002 ibid, p 239 
7 ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World.’ European Security Strategy, 12 December 2003 
8 R.Kagan (2002)‘Power and Weakness’,Policy Review 113 
9 A.Hyde-Price 2004 ‘European Security, Strategic Culture and the Use of Force’ European Security 
Vol 13:4 pp323-342   6 
A second foreign policy discourse reflects more closely the culture of 
intergovernmental policy-making which governs CFSP and which has grown 
progressively since 1999 with the development of the European Security and Defence 
Policy. As ESDP has grown in size, scope and ambition, this discourse has become 
more dominant.  It priveleges effectiveness, and focuses on the empirics of collective 
policy-making, in the form of its ends and achievements, rather than the manner of its 
doing. It can be discerned in three distinct forms: firstly the emphasis on the EU as an 
‘active’ foreign policy player, where active is deemed to be positive, not passive, and 
autonomous, rather than at the demand of  NATO or the United States
10 ; secondly the 
concern with coherence – or lack thereof – in the range of policy instruments and 
initiatives in both the ‘Community pillar’ and the Council, and attempts to address 
gaps in ESDP capabilities on both a thematic and geographic level, through the 
Hampton Court agenda of 2005, and the Commission’s subsequent initiative to 
promote inter-pillar co-ordination 
11; thirdly and of longer standing, the drive to 
increase the Union’s capabilities particularly in the area of security and defence, 
including proposals for conventional military build-up expressed in the 2008 and 
2010 Headline Goals for respectively civilian and military resources ,and referred to 
in the ESS.  
 
Symbolism is no longer enough, indeed it may be positively disparaged: through this 
discourse, power in its more conventional forms, is making a bid for reconsideration. 
The subtext of initiatives to advance the Union’s security policy is that military force 
or at least various forms of coercive capacity are necessary in order for the EU to play 
the role it desires on the world stage. This was the lesson of the conflicts which 
followed the break up of Yugoslavia through to both Iraq wars. At the same time, a 
return to geopolitics, linked to questions of energy resources or the return of long 
standing territorial issues and spheres of influence on the Union’s periphery also fuels 
a retreat from the soft power agenda which seemed appropriate in the immediate 
aftermath of the end of the Cold War. 
                                                 
10 European Security Strategy ibid; S.Biscop ‘Courage and Capabilities for a “More Active” EU’, 
Report from the 1
st European Strategic Forum, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Warsaw 2006. 
11 Hampton Court summit, press release 4 November 2005 www.eu2005.gov.uk ;’Europe in the World 
– Some Practical Proposals for Greater Coherence, Effectiveness and Visibility’, Communication from 
the Commission to the European Council, June 2006   7 
Whitman suggests that the doctrine of the European Security Strategy is more about 
Europe feeling good about itself, than the purposes to which its power might be put. It 
is true that the term ‘power’ does not appear, although synonyms such as ‘global 
player’ point to the same sort of ambition. 
12For the moment, the effectiveness and the 
normative  discourses  bump  along  together,  although  both  demand  further 
qualification, and there are calls to strengthen one or other.
 13 Without suggesting that 
the EU has to choose between norms and effectiveness, an awkward juxtaposition of 
these two discourses weakens the Union’s identity, and particularly its self-confidence 
and presence as an international actor.  For example, while civil-military co-operation 
in  crisis  management  operations  has  become  a  central  issue  on  the  international 
security agenda, and is seen by the EU as a way of squaring the circle of hard and soft 
power, it remains unclear how a comprehensive concept of security really works, or 
just  as  importantly  what  the  underlying  philosophy  behind  such  co-ordination/co-
operation is. 
14 
 
Thus, while the clash between the effectiveness discourse and the normative agenda 
of the EU has already been noted
15  there is much more to be done in considering how 
these two discourses can be better reconciled, or indeed any overlap between them 
exploited. If civilian power no longer quite fits, and normative power is indeed a 
paradox, if not a contradiction in terms, how can the EU resolve it, to be both ‘good’ 
and ‘forceful’, as suggested for example by the ESS?  
The crucial consideration here is not the analytical problems surrounding the nature of 
the EU’s external identity, but the operational implications of a lack of clarity and the 
disjuncture between different accounts of its personality. 
The growth of ESDP in terms of the number of missions requiring large numbers of 
personnel – whether civilian or military – has raised the stakes in this debate. So 
indirectly, has the failure of the Constitutional Treaty with its provisions for an EU 
                                                 
12 R. Whitman (2006)‘Road Map for a Route March? (De)Civilianizing through the EU’s Security 
Strategy’, European Foreign Affairs Review 11:8 
13 See for example H.Sjursen (2006)’ The EU as a “normative” power: how can this be?’, Journal of 
European Public Policy, 13:2 March 2006 p 235-51; S. Biscop ibid. 
14 R. Gowan (2005) ‘ The Battlegroups: A concept in search of a strategy’, in S.Biscop ed. E Pluribus 
Unum? Military Integration in the European Union  
15 F.Heisbourg (2000) ‘European Strategic Ambition:The Limits of Ambiguity’, Survival, The IISS 
K.Smith (2003) European Foreign Policy in a Changing World, Cambridge Polity Press;Quarterly Vol 
42 Number 2 Summer 2000; J.Lindley-French (2004)‘The Revolution in Security Affairs: Hard and 
Solft Security Dynamics in the 21
st Century’, European Security 13 pp1-15; Whitman (2006) ibid.    8 
foreign minister and a common external action service, intended to institutionalise the 
directions set out in the European Security Strategy. Highlighting different theoretical 
approaches  merely  serves  to  underline  the  fact  that  political  and  operational 
consistency remains a necessary component of European foreign policy, which has 
proved particularly elusive. 
 
2. Telling security 
A central mechanism for influencing discourse and constructing identity is 
‘narration’. As Anderson suggested, identities are imagined communities, rather than 
pre-given, and narrating foundational fictions or traditions is a way of stimulating 
social and political imaginings.
16 Narratives can be individual and/or collective stories 
which reveal someone’s experiences ; they communicate human knowledge, 
sensations of or reactions to events and the social environment , and they also help to 
enact and produce shifts in that environment.  
 
Some literature about EU security focuses on the need for a common strategic 
‘culture’
17, but the term is often used loosely without investigating what the process of 
embedding a culture would actually entail. The creation of strategic culture may be 
less susceptible to management or conscious initiative, in short a lot more complex 
than the production of narratives. Narratives connect elite discourses with more 
widespread understanding of issues, interests and values, and contribute to a process 
of ‘sense-making’ which helps to circulate information among wider publics as well 
as narrow elites.  
‘Narrative treat events as signposts pointing beyond themselves to states of 
affairs to which we have no direct, immediate access – traces of a buried past, 
pointers towards an understanding of hypercomplex conditions, signs from 
which the future can be predicted’. 
18 
 
                                                 
16B. Anderson,(1983)Imagined Communities (London, Verso); E. Hobsbawm(1983) ‘Inventing 
Traditions’, in E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger (eds) The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge CUP) 
 
17 Hyde-Price (2004) ibid. P. Cornish and G. Edwards (2001)’Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomoy: the 
Beginnings of a European Strategic Culture?’ International Affairs 77( 3). 
18 V. Heins (2002) ‘Germany’s new War: 11 September and Its Aftermath in German Quality 
Newspapers’ German Politics 11(2) pp128-145   9 
Timothy Garton Ash places the idea of a new European narrative in even more 
concise terms, as a storyline through which Europeans will be able to regain a lost 
‘plot’.  
‘Europe no longer knows what story it wants to tell. A shared political 
narrative sustained the postwar project of (west) European integration for three 
generations, but it has fallen apart since the end of the cold war. Most 
Europeans now have little idea where we're coming from; far less do we share 
a vision of where we want to go to. We don't know why we have an EU or 
what it's good for. So we urgently need a new narrative.’ 
19 
 
Garton Ash’s proposal for a new European story is founded on six value-based 
strands such as solidarity, peace, prosperity and which produce a concrete identity or 
sense of self, but which dwell in the present rather than being only reworkings of old 
myths.  
 
There is also importantly, a highly public character to his narrative: it is something to 
be debated on the web and in print or on television and radio. It is a means by which 
the European grass roots – Polish plumbers and students on Easyjet – can openly and 
explicitly share a sense of commonality about their prosperity, freedom and diversity.  
A historical perspective on narrative suggests its instrumental qualities: as a 
representation of the real , which has a social role as a form of ideology.
20 Rather than 
being a neutral articulation of human experience it imposes a form of closure on the 
disorder of the real world – both contemporary and historic, and thereby provides the 
reader with a ‘reassuring sense of her identity and integration in the social order’.
21 
 
Whose narrative? is an important question related to its appropriateness. A foreign 
policy narrative has to operate among different types of public. Janus- like, its story is 
geared to two kinds of audience at once and must respond to both internalist and 
externalist dynamics. The internalist elements of a strategic narrative are about 
making sense of what European foreign policy is for, to those inside the EU who 
implement it, fund it and legitimise it. It operates at the level of national and EU 
                                                 
19 T Garton Ash, T (2007) ‘Europe’s True Stories’, Prospect, Issue 131 February, 2007 
20 H. White (1975)Metahistory Baltimore Press  
21 A. Callinicos ,(1995)Theories and Narratives. Reflections on the Philosophy of History, Duke 
University Press, Durham p210   10 
policy-makers and planners, in the form of military and civilian doctrines, rules of 
engagement, operating manuals and organisational frames for policy initiatives. It also 
supplies the fabric for public engagement with the Union’s foreign policy, and is the 
means by which public support for the EU’s external activities might be won, lost or 
recaptured.  
 
Eurobarometer polls suggest that foreign policy is one of the most popular areas of 
collective policy-making and EU integration, although traditionally this has also been 
an area where many nation states, and the EU, have been reticent to indulge 
transparency or formal public involvement in decision-making.
22 Currently, ESDP 
missions have low public visibility, despite efforts by the European Parliament to 
stage more debates in this area and with notable exceptions such as the vigorous 
debate in the German parliament over the 2006 deployment to DR Congo. However, 
one means of sustaining public interest in and support for a European foreign policy 
would be to build its reflexive dimension and to allow EU citizens beyond a narrow 
political elite, to engage with the ideas and ideals behind EU foreign policy, via a 
(contestable) foreign policy narrative.  
 
The externalist factors to which a strategic narrative must respond are its capacity to 
express and project the Union’s intentions towards third parties – most usually, states. 
A strategic narrative encapsulates a rationale for intervention, and for engagement 
with other states and regions. It serves to make sense of the Union’s international 
presence for outside elites and populations. It also has the potential to determine and 
change the terms of dialogue between the Union and its external interlocutors and 
thus recalibrate relationships.  
 
A strategic narrative is an explicit attempt to define and enact two processes central to 
the internalist and externalist logics of foreign policy: identification and legitimation. 
Not only does it say who ‘we’ are and what ‘we’ aspire to be and do in the world, but 
it seeks to supply a rationale for what we are and do. In the table below I set out how 
both these logics interact with processes of self-characterisation and validation so that 
identification and legitimation are staged for internal audiences, while the projection 
                                                 
22 www.europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion    11 
of personality and justification of actions occur towards external non-EU audiences.  
For the EU, a strategic narrative also fulfills a third process of integration. Although 
there may be variations of the European story, and it should be flexible enough to 
accommodate cultural nuances, it carries the theoretical possibility that over 450 
million people with different historical, geographical, social and political influences 
can subscribe to it and it will also represent, in aggregate the sum of their ambitions 
and intentions towards the world beyond the EU’s borders.  
 
Garton Ash is clear about the integrative possibilities of a European narrative. He 
dismisses the ‘negative stereotyping ‘ involved in Othering towards the US or Islam 
as well as traditional EU discourses about unity and/or power as producing more 
division than integration, and of replicating nationalist methods which the EU was 
created to overcome. This ignores the fact that narratives can of themselves be forms 
of Othering, and also tell or re-tell stories of national myths and/or power. Thus the 
question is not just of the EU requiring its own new story, but what kind of story.   
 
Furthermore, in considering the complex mosaic of European foreign and security 
policy, composed of national, intergovernmental and community institutions and 
initiatives, a narrative has to integrate not only across national borders, and between 
national and supranational levels of decision-making but across EU institutions and 
the bureaucratic divisions erected within foreign policy-making, and also across 
different professional cultures and capacities such as military, civilian, NGOs, hard 
security, humanitarian aid, economics, trade and so forth. Therefore it has to be a 
functional mechanism which organises these diverse elements into some form of 
coherent whole. The aim is to present a picture of European foreign policy in contrast 
to a ‘chaos of fragments with no particular pattern’
23. In addition to providing 
symbolic resonance through identification and legitimation, reflexivity and a specific 
narrative is an organisational tool, imposing order and consistency on diverse foreign 
policy actions. It is more than a ‘poetic act’, it is a ‘focusing of content into a single 
coherent story’ .
24 
 
 
                                                 
23 Callinicos 1995 ibid, p204 
24 L.Stone, 1(1989)‘The Revival of narrative’ Past and Present 85, p3   12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Internalist                              Externalist 
 
Symbolic 
Identification/identity     Personality  
          projection 
  Legitimation        Justification 
  Integration        Coherence  
        Organisation  
 
 
 
 
Europe’s strategic storyline 
 
The  European  Security  Strategy  was  an  essential  first  step  towards  narrating  the 
Union’s foreign policy personality, but it leaves unanswered key questions about why 
the Union should intervene beyond its borders, where it should do so, and according 
to which criteria. A growing corpus of knowledge and experience from its diverse 
interventions to date remains fractured without a strategic overview to exploit these 
experiences for future action. Thus to some critics, the EU’s security strategy is only a 
‘pre-strategic concept’.
25 Moreover, it is hardly the kind of tub-thumping populist 
story which percolates down from the policy-making elite to harness public support 
behind engagements which increasingly put European citizens in harm’s way.  
 
                                                 
25 J.Lindley-French ’The Revolution in security affairs: hard and soft security dynamics in the 21st 
century. European Security, 2004, 13(1):1-15, 2004.   13 
The Union does not lack administrative labels for its external actions:civilian crisis 
management, conflict prevention, civil-military co-operation, small arms and light 
weapons (SALW) are policy descriptions which tell partial stories about the EU’s 
ambitions and presence as an international actor. The EU’s Strategy for Africa, 
published in 2005, is also a label which encompasses a range of regionally focused, 
cross-pillar initiatives in areas like development, security and governance, education 
and health. The Strategy, drafted by the Commission and adopted by the European 
Council is a framework initiative which exemplifies how an ideal-typical European 
foreign policy should function.
26 As well as describing EU-African relations in new 
terms, it is also meant to be the basis for a structured dialogue between the EU and 
African states which puts their relationship on a new footing, and in this sense, it is a 
consciously reflexive tool as well as a normative, organising frame. This shift is 
justified in the Strategy by the fact that Africa has changed and become something 
different. Yet there is no accompanying narrative which describes for both sides what 
sort of actor the EU now is. 
27 
 
A more ambitious project is the proposal that the Union adopt human security as a 
strategic narrative. In 2004, the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 
convened by the High Representative, Javier Solana recommended that the Union 
adopt a Human Security approach to realise its ambitions to play a global security 
role, while also reflecting its distinctive character as a polity committed to 
foundational ideas of peace, democracy and human rights rather than the classic 
nation-state defence of territory. The group concluded that ‘the most appropriate role 
for Europe in the twenty-first century would be to promote human security’. In 2006, 
the study group, under the aegis of the Finnish presidency, elaborated this claim by 
proposing that human security, should form the basis of a European strategic 
narrative: 
‘Human Security is not simply a ‘leitmotif’ for EU security policies
28, or an 
analytical label which categorises the EU’s international role in the way that 
concepts  such  as  normative  power  or  civilian  power  have  done.  Rather,  it 
                                                 
26 ‘The EU’s new Strategy for Africa:Real and Effective Multilateralism?’ Europaische Politik, 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, November 2006.  
27 European Commission, DG Development ‘The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership’. 
28 Sascha Werthes and David Bosold, ‘Caught between pretension and substantiveness: ambiguities of 
Human Security as a political leitmotif’, in Tobias Debiel and Sascha Werthes, eds., Human Security 
on foreign policy agendas, changes, concepts and cases (Duisburg: Eigenverlag, 2006).    14 
provides an ongoing and dynamic organising frame for security action, which 
is currently absent from European foreign policy texts and practices. For this 
reason Human Security can be seen as a pro-active strategic narrative which 
has the potential to further European Union foreign policy integration.’ 
29 
 
The precise terms of this narrative remain open: for example the degree to which it 
might represent a radical reworking of current security policies, or a rebranding of 
existing policies, or something in between the two. Is it a narrative for conflict and 
crisis, or can it be taken to encompass foreign policy in toto, and to what extent is it a 
discrete European narrative, or, on the other hand, an inclusive mechanism which 
makes it possible, even easier perhaps,  for the EU to work with other organisations 
and states? 
 
What is clear is that Kaldor’s proposition seeks to address the need for a self-reflexive 
element to European foreign policy, to promote political and conceptual coherence, 
articulate better the goals and methodology of external relations, and raise the 
visibility of ESDP in particular, to bring European publics on board. Thus an 
important aspect of the Human Security doctrine is not just that it shifts the referent 
point for EU security policies, but that it has the potential as a more useful operational 
code than previous, largely analytical terms such as civilian or normative power.  
 
Matlary also sees a human security model as offering the EU a way through the 
theoretical, if not the operational thicket of the use of force, which would denote it as 
a strategic actor, combined with a policy based on human rights and the use of legal 
instruments. ‘The concept (of human security) ‘weds’ human rights to security, 
including military security’. 
30 For Liotta and Owen a European Human Security 
doctrine is the ‘most direct document to date to openly declare Europe’s responsibility 
to act, independently if necessary…beyond its borders’
31.  
 
                                                 
29 M.Kaldor,M.Martin & S.Selchow (2007) ‘Human Security: a new strategic narrative for the EU’, 
International Affairs Vol 83 Number 2, and Report of the Human Security Study Group, (2007 
forthcoming)  
30 J.Matlary (2006)‘When Soft Power Turns Hard. Is an EU Strategic Culture possible?’, Security 
Dialogue Vol 37 no 1 March 
31 P.Liotta and T.Owen,(2006)  ‘Sense and Symbolism. Europe takes on Human Security’, Parameters   15 
Meanwhile the Commissioner for external relations (a former chairwoman of the 
Human Security network) has emphasised the value of human security as a normative 
benchmark for EU policies, which can also provide a common theme to a range of 
initiatives on security sector reform, landmines and gender issues.
32 
While most interest has focussed on human security’s potential as a policy approach, 
the added value of a Human Security approach to the EU is in its communicative 
potential to bridge between power/effectiveness and norms.  
 
The  failure  of  the  European  Constitutional  Treaty  in  2005  and  uncertainty  over 
whether  and  how  it  might  be  revived,  has  made  institutional  progress  on  foreign 
policy  more  difficult.  The  French  and  Dutch  referenda  also  created  a  crisis  of 
democratic  accountability  among  member  states  paralysing  integration,  and 
exacerbated  by  domestic  political  stalemates  during  this  period  in  the  Big  Three 
foreign policy member states, Germany, France and the UK.  
 
At  the  same  time    the  high  water  mark  of  EU  enlargement,  arguably  its  most 
successful  foreign  policy  has  passed,  following  accession  of  the  new  central  and 
eastern  European  states,  while  future  rounds  involving  Turkey  and  some  of  the 
Balkan  states  are  highly  contested.  Successor  policies  designed  to  systematise 
relations with neighbours to the east and south of the Union’s borders offer less clear-
cut avenues of external stabilisation.  
 
A Human Security narrative argues Kaldor, is required precisely because it would re-
animate EU external relations without the need for institutional innovation, and it 
would do so in a way which reflects the self identity of Europeans, reiterates and 
reinforce the foundational ideas behind European external relations, of projecting 
peace and co-operation beyond the Union’s own boundaries. Potentially, it could also 
offer a means to bring together crisis policies under ESDP including responses to 
natural disasters, with broader security and foreign policy initiatives including the 
Neighbourhood policy and migration policies.  
                                                 
32  Benita Ferrero-Waldner, ‘Conflict Prevention –looking to the future’, Brussels 12 September, 2006 
‘The EU’s role in protecting Europe’s security’. Speech to conference on Protecting Europe, Brussels, 
30 May 2006; ‘Human security and aid’,  Speech to All Party Group on Aid, House of Commons, 
London 26 October, 2006.  
   16 
 
While such claims require more research to test them empirically, there are grounds to 
suppose that a Human Security narrative draws on an established well of normative 
discourse in European foreign policies, and that it exists ‘between the lines’ of current 
practices, so that there is indeed something ‘European’ about such a narrative.  
 
Human  security,  as  a  term,  can  be  understood  to  encompass  the  EU  concepts  of 
conflict prevention, crisis management and civil-military coordination, but it takes 
them further. It draws on the debates generated by these concepts as well as other 
terms used more broadly in the current global discourse such as ‘responsibility to 
protect’,‘effective multilateralism’ and ‘human development’.  
 
Human security is about crisis management but it is more than crisis management 
since it offers a perspective on crises, by articulating the complex and interrelated 
conditions which produce and precede crises, and by defining responses to them. 
From  a  human  security  perspective,  the  aim  is  not  just  political  stability;  it 
encompasses a notion of justice and sustainability. Whereas stability or ‘management 
of crisis’ tends to be about the absence of overt conflict or, in economic terms, about 
halting a downward spiral of GDP or the value of a currency, human security extends 
the reach of policies to deal with crime, human rights violations and  joblessness. The 
parlance  of  crisis  management,  especially  on  the  civil  side,  within  the  European 
Union emphasises some of these ‘vulnerabilities’ , and its focus on  strengthening the 
‘rule of law’, embraces distributive and justice issues. However, the contention is that 
the  language  of  human  security  would  further  entrench  this  kind  of  thinking  and 
would help to underline the need to address ‘vulnerabilities’ in ways which reduce the 
risk of renewed crisis.  
 
Similarly, human security capabilities, like crisis management, require civil-military 
co-ordination. But it is more than just a matter of coordination, or ‘integration’ or 
‘synergies’ to borrow from current parlance; human security is about how and why 
civil and military capabilities are combined, rather than a reflex action to use them as 
part of a standard conflict toolkit. 
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Thus a Human Security narrative would represent a qualitative shift, not just at a 
discursive level, but in organizing EU foreign policy actions at an operational level 
also. The criticism leveled at this kind of normative narrative is that it is based on a 
concept which is too wide and vague to be of practical use. The term human security 
was first put into the policy domain by the United Nations in 1994, and has come to 
represent a broad spectrum of threats and challenges which fall into the ‘freedom 
from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’ categories. 
33 The task for the EU is to define 
human  security  in  a  way  which  is  characteristically  European  as  distinct  from 
Canadian  or  Japanese,  to  take  two  of  the  leading  versions  of  a  Human  Security 
policy
34. The Human Security doctrine proposed a set of five principles: the primacy 
of  human  rights,  legitimate  political  authority,  a  bottom  up  approach,  effective 
multilateralism and a regional focus as the framework for an EU Human Security 
policy. By using these principles as a framework, it is argued that the EU would add 
to what it already does in the area of a normative foreign policy by developing a 
shared strategic narrative with several consequences: 
a)  Coherence. Rather than succumbing to turf-fighting and bureaucratic 
competition or adding to the layers of administration with new institutional 
mechanisms, conceptual coherence, being clear about shared goals and 
principles would address the inter-pillar and inter-professional fragmentation 
which dogs EU external relations.  
b)  Effectiveness. The principles of human security would provide a focus for 
external mandates. They offer a framework for standardising doctrines and 
rules of engagement. Essentially, the principles, adapted to each situation, 
could be expressed as modus operandi and as a checklist for those involved in 
planning and evaluating operations. They would provide a reference point for 
EU intervention, and could help address resource allocation and generation 
issues and ‘value for money’ arguments which have barely been broached yet 
in the rapid development of CFSP. 
                                                 
33 M Glasius (2006) ‘All Things to All Men.the Gospel of Human Security’, Paper presented to the 
British International Studies Association conference, Cork December 18. 
34 Throughout this paper I use capitals to denote a specific approach, in contrast to ‘human security’ as 
a generic term; the distinction follows the convention used by International Relations to denote a 
discipline rather than international relations as the relations between actors in the international system.    18 
c)  Visibility.  An understandable policy concept could help increase the public 
impact of EU missions, and raise debate about both the internal and external 
legitimacy of intervention, underpinning it with a set of norms and values, and 
offering both EU citizens and those in target countries with clear principles 
and justifications for security policy.  
  
None of these aspects of a Human Security narrative resolves ontological questions 
about a European security policy, or provides more definitive answers to what kind of 
international  actor  the  EU  actually  is,  although  the  framework  principles  provide 
some a priori pointers to how the Union could prioritise and legitimize different types 
of normative actions including external interventions.  
 
 
 
3. The European Union in the Democratic Republic of Congo – lessons in Human 
Security? 
 
In 2006, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) sought to bring an end to its civil 
war with the first free elections in 46 years since its independence from Belgium. 
Presidential and parliamentary elections were to be the culmination of a transition 
process to democracy in which the European Union was the largest single financial 
backer.
35 
The decision to dispatch an ESDP force to DRC to assist the United Nations 
peacekeeping force already present in the country, during the election period and give 
military weight to the EU’s support for transition was approved by the European 
Council on 27 April 2006, following a UN Security Council Resolution (1671). From 
the outset EUFOR was a highly political military mission. Although the decision had 
international legitimacy, including the full backing of the Congolese transitional 
government, it triggered a lengthy controversy particularly in Germany which was the 
host nation of the operational headquarters of the mission (in Potsdam) and which 
supplied its commander, General Karlheinz Viereck. He was supported by a French 
force commander on the ground, Christian Damay.  
 
                                                 
35 The Commission plus member states provided half of the $400m estimated costs of the electoral 
process, including a monitoring mission.    19 
For the EU, the mission broke new ground in engaging the Union as a hard security 
actor, with military force at its disposal, in an African country with no prior or 
accompanying NATO involvement. Germany, which provided the operational 
commander and headquarters for the mission and over 700 troops, had been 
particularly nervous about involving its military in African security, and struggled to 
answer the fundamental question of what it was doing in Congo in the first place.  
German concerns centred on the risks that German soldiers might incur, and on the 
political exposure the mission represented for a country which was still nervous about 
‘out of area’ engagements. A heated debate in the Bundestag which had to approve 
the deployment of German soldiers echoed wider questions in the EU about what was 
ESDP for and what was meant to be the role and purpose of European soldiers in a 
remote country in Africa.
36 Among those involved in planning the mission, several 
military and civilian personnel articulated a ‘nightmare scenario’ of (white)’European 
troops opening fire on African civilians’.
37 
 
Public perceptions of EUFOR beyond Germany were also lukewarm. In the region, it 
was criticised for having the majority of its troops based in Gabon hundreds of miles 
away from any potential conflict.
38 To observers, it looked like another example of 
European tokenism – a paper tiger to vaunt the Union’s pretensions as a serious 
security actor. Apart from German troops, the force consisted of 18 different national 
contingents, posing an integration challenge to commanders who in the short, four 
month time span of the operation, had to forge a common ethos and negotiate the 
complex national caveats and operating constraints governing each member state’s 
involvement.  
 
The mission was also groundbreaking in the way it fulfilled its mandate, and the 
methods  it  deployed,  with  a  combination  of  robust  military  force  and  carefully 
planned initiatives to make the intervention of European troops acceptable to the local 
population. There have been few examples to date of the EU deploying hard power in 
favour of the so called ‘soft goals’ of human development, although the build up of 
military resources for autonomous missions is designed to do just that. 
                                                 
36 See for example, S. Amann 17 May, 2006 ‘Von Sinn und Unsinn des Kongo-Einsatzes’, FT 
Deutschland ; 1 June, 2006 ‘Kongo-Einsatz. Kein Konzept’ lead article,FT Deutschland   
37 Interview Civ-mil staff, Brussels, 15 November, 2006. 
38 Telephone interview, Jeff Koinange CNN  South Africa, 20 November, 2006   20 
EUFOR RDC was the clearest case to date of how the EU can use a mix of external 
instruments from military force to civilian assistance to pursue human security goals.  
 
Despite the misgivings in Berlin , the mission has been deemed a success
39, and has as 
a result probably paved the way for further EU military expeditions, including more to 
crisis regions in Africa.
40 EUFOR RDC represents an important advance not only in 
what it achieved in terms of stabilisation and conflict prevention, but for how it 
operated. For in some respects, in both its original design and implementation, 
EUFOR was human security in action, in the way a military mission could be used to 
promote the long-term well-being of individuals with no ambition to control or defend 
territory, and to treat them as if they were citizens rather than an alien population.  
 
The mission had a well-defined human rights focus, with a permanent advisor 
attached to the force on the ground in Kinshasa for much of the mission. Troop patrols 
were often accompanied by human rights specialists and/or medical staff. Soldiers 
carried a specially designed card setting out their rules of engagement in terms which 
emphasised how to deal with child soldiers, women and evidence of human rights 
abuses, as well as their own general behaviour towards civilians. The mission also 
developed an innovative outreach programme to link the presence of the military 
force to the electoral process, with the publication of specially produced newspapers, 
radio slots and public meetings to explain, in neutral terms, the progress of the 
presidential campaign. 
 
Yet arguably the most successful aspect of the EUFOR mission was its use of force to 
impose order in the capital during the most tense moments of the election period. 
When fighting broke out between rival militias in August 2006, EUFOR helped to 
break up the fighting and re-establish peace. Restrained use of Mirage jets overflying 
Kinshasa, coupled with a willingness to intervene decisively when required 
established the force as an impartial yet effective actor.  
 
                                                 
39 Evidence of Lt-Gen Jean-Paul Perruche , director-general EU Military Staff to European Parliament, 
Brussels 9 October, 2006 
 
40 Javier Solana , presentation to UN Security Council, 9 January, 2007 
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The human security implications of the EUFOR mission can be viewed along two 
trajectories, which reflect the internalist and externalist logics outlined in section 1 
above. The internalist aspects of the mission were highly significant in view of the 
differences with previous ESDP engagements and the controversy it caused, 
particularly in Germany prior to deployment. EUFOR RDC has been described as a 
‘big step for the EU, a small step for Congo’
41 A narrative to articulate and explain 
why the EU should intervene in DRC and the clear goals of the mission would 
probably have helped in the public discussion of the deployment, both in the 
Bundestag and European Parliament debates. As it was, opposition to the mission 
resulted in the mandate being severely restricted, and in particular a time limit placed 
on the operation, which had the effect of curtailing it prematurely while there was still 
a realistic threat of violence marring the democratic process.
42 
 
A Human Security narrative would also have served an integrative function in 
providing additional glue for the operational personnel from across EU member 
states, who arrived in Kinshasa with different perceptions of their mission and 
drawing on different professional and cultural experiences. In a short-duration ESDP 
mission, valuable time was lost in forging a common force, with a shared ethos. 
 
 The most serious shortcoming of the mission was the lack of integration with existing 
EU initiatives on the ground, both those by the European Commission under DG 
Development and DG Relex, and two other civilian ESDP missions dealing with 
police and security sector reform. Rather than seeing the total EU engagement, and 
particularly the substantial measures to support the electoral process, as one piece, the 
different initiatives were pursued independently with little overlap, or leverage from 
one to another. The EU lacked an overarching ‘mission statement’ to define its broad 
goals in DRC and as a result much of its recent work is plagued by bureaucratic 
competition, and missed opportunities.  
 
The externalist logic of a human security narrative is that Congolese acceptance of 
EUFOR would also have been made easier by a better understanding of what the EU 
                                                 
41 Hans Hoebeke, Egmont Institute, remarks to the 2
nd European Strategic Forum ‘Missions in 
Transition:Interlocking or Interblocking Security Policies’ Brussels 3 May, 2007. 
42 This argument was reinforced by human rights abuses and violence in the month after the European 
troops left Kinshasa.    22 
mission was. During its first two months in Kinshasa , the force struggled to 
overcome local hostility which was centred on a number of ‘myths’ such as the 
Europeans had come to secure the victory of Joseph Kabila, the interim president and 
eventual winner of the election, who is unpopular in Kinshasa; that they had come to 
plunder DRC natural resources, and that the Congolese were paying for the mission 
themselves. The legitimacy of EUFOR, although underwritten by a clear legal 
mandate at the international level, could not be assured at the local level, and was 
probably jeopardised by the poor regard of the Congolese for the UN peacekeeping 
force in the country. A human security narrative could in this respect help the EU to 
justify its presence in out of area engagements, with a clearer definition of its 
normative objectives.  
 
Moreover, although EUFOR managed to raise its local profile by being seen to 
suppress the eruption of violence in August 2006, the EU’s overall visibility and 
effectiveness in DRC remains below par, largely because of a lack of coherence 
between ESDP and Commission instruments and the failure to translate success in one 
area – the military mission – into a longer term impact, through a common set of 
articulated goals.  
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion   
 
The EUFOR mission in DRC showed that the Union takes seriously its ambition to 
use coercive force in support of core norms such as human rights and democracy.  
However this combination is both novel and controversial. In the absence, for the 
moment, of sufficient precedents or a fully elaborated doctrine as to how this mix 
works, the EU risks becoming stranded between its past as a normative power, relying 
on soft techniques of persuasion, and a future in which it assumes a more strategic 
role in international politics with a full range of military and civilian instruments. The 
juxtaposition of discourses about norms and effectiveness illustrates this tension at the 
heart of the EU’s foreign policy identity. 
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This paper has argued for two things: firstly that a strategic narrative is one way in 
which the EU can address the need for greater clarity about its goals and methods as a 
global actor. At the analytical level it can be argued that something else is required to 
explain and encapsulate the hybrid character of the EU as an international actor if 
normative power by itself does not fulfil this function
43, but at the strategic and 
operational levels, there is also a need for clearer articulation and focus to the EU’s 
increasing range of initiatives and methodologies. The targets of greater reflexivity 
within the EU’s foreign policies would be not only its own citizens but those in 
countries where it intervenes.  
 
Secondly it has argued that a Human Security approach could be the basis for such a 
narrative, in that it draws on what is already being done by the EU, but goes further in 
bridging the apparent divide between an emphasis on norms and a readiness to use 
coercive force. A Human Security narrative could also provide a more nuanced 
explanation and justification for how these two types of instrument can and should be 
combined.    
 
 While a public language of foreign policy is beginning to emerge from the EU’s 
experiences of collective action, particularly as a result of the rapid growth of ESDP 
capacities in the last four years, official texts such as the European Security Strategy, 
the Strategy for Africa and the recent Commission and Council paper on security 
sector reform, to name but a few, offer only partial insights into the nature of 
European foreign policy.  
 
European foreign policy discourse is currently stranded in fragmented rhetoric and 
multiple policy labels. These add to the confusion of purpose behind ESDP and 
CFSP, and they contribute to a lack of transparency and visibility. Human Security, 
already implicit in EU practices and policies , could provide a new narrative 
dimension to the Union’s foreign policy personality. 
                                                 
43 H. Sjursen (2006) ibid. 